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Loyal Opposition in a Modem Democracy
George Anastaplo*
So spoke Mardonius and stopped, having put a smooth coating on
[King] Xerxes' opinion [that the Persians should invade Greece]. All
the rest of the Persians held their tongues and did not venture to
declare a judgment opposite to that which was in discussion. But then
Artabanus, the son of Hystaspes and Xerxes' uncle-and who trusted
in his kinship--spoke up: "My lord, when no opposing opinions are
presented, it is impossible to choose the better, but one must accept
what is proposed. When such opposites are stated, it is as it is with
gold, the purity of which one cannot judge in itself, but only if you rub
it alongside other gold on the touchstone and see the difference .... "
- Herodotus, History, VII, 16
I.
January 20, 2001 marked the inauguration of a new President of the
United States of America. It also celebrated a constitutional way of life
which is critical to the workings and prospects of democracy in the
modem world. This was a peaceful transfer of power between political
parties that is no longer seen as remarkable in the United States but that
was extraordinary when it first occurred in 1801.
A change of President in the United States sometimes means only a
change of personnel, not of political party, in the Executive Branch of
the Government. This could be seen, for example, when George H.W.
Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan in 1989. But at other times, a change
of political party is seen as well, as has happened (since the Second
World War) in 1953, 1961, 1969, 1977, 1981, 1993, and 2001. The
most dramatic form of the changing of the guard, therefore, finds the
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Loyal Opposition actually taking over. Those who have exercised the
powers of the Executive then become the Loyal Opposition, albeit an
opposition that could at once begin to work toward its eventual return to
power. It is no surprise, therefore, when the party in opposition begins
questioning the new President's programs shortly after he is
inaugurated, if not even before.
Loyal Opposition in a modern democracy usually takes the form of
competing, yet somehow cooperating, political parties. The loyal
opposition to those in power both depends upon and contributes to other
institutions, such as a free press and the economic organization of the
community. The possibility of loyal opposition helps to insure what the
Declaration of Independence called "the Consent of the Governed,"
which can be considered the foundation not only of democracy but also
of all just regimes. At the very least, those who exercise power are
obliged to confront the opinions and the organized political efforts of all
significant elements in the country. An acknowledged constitutional
system provides the soil in which the institution of the Loyal Opposition
is rooted. Among the problems posed by a constitutional system are the
difficulty of accommodating an opposition which criticizes the party in
power and offers its own programs as alternatives and the difficulty of
managing a peaceful transfer of power between two political parties.
Those in the United States who do take over the Executive have not
been merely in opposition up to that point. Typically, they have been
serving either in the national legislature or in State governments.
Although they may have been excluded from the national executive up
to that point, they may themselves have been in control of the national
legislature or in control of one or more branches of State
governments-with loyal oppositions of their own to deal with. A
parliamentary system is quite different from a presidential system in
that the executive usually depends for his authority upon the support of
the majority of the legislature.
However much the American Presidency is dramatized these days,
the national executive can even find itself serving, in effect, as a loyal
opposition: The President may be obliged to try to do what he can to put
a brake on the efforts and policies of the national legislature, especially
when that legislature is controlled by the party that also controls
important State governments. Furthermore, it can be misleading to
consider the Republicans to have returned to power in 2001 with the
inauguration of a Chief Executive, however important the President is in
conducting the foreign policy of the country and in proposing measures
for Congress to consider. Rather, the Republicans in 2001 extended to
the Executive the considerable power they already had in Congress.
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Loyal Opposition may be built into any system, such as that in the
United States, which has an effective separation of powers. Each of the
three branches of government-legislative, executive, and judicial-has
a tenure in office and an array of powers that are largely independent of
the other two branches. Separation of powers is reinforced when
powers are distributed, as in the United States, not only among the
branches of the national government but also between the national and
State governments. In addition, there can be divisions within both the
legislative and executive branches. That is, there may be within the
legislative branch not only a vigorous opposition party helping to shape
legislation but also critical divisions in the majority party, especially
when, as in the United States, individual members of Congress are
largely independent of any national political party. Also, there may be
within the executive branch not only a permanent bureaucracy for the
President to contend with but also a significant difference among his
political supporters.
The United States Constitution, for example, originally provided that
the Vice President would be the person who secured the second highest
number of electors for the Presidency. This meant, in effect, that the
President would likely have as his Vice President someone who had
been an electoral opponent. Thus, John Adams's Vice President in
1797 was his political rival, Thomas Jefferson, who would defeat him in
the following Presidential election. This particular source of
divisiveness within the Executive was changed in 1804 by the Twelfth
Amendment, which provides for separate votes by the electors for the
President and Vice President, thereby permitting the coupling of
candidates for these two offices. This reflects and reinforces the
development of political parties in the United States. It is now virtually
assured that the President and the Vice President, however incompatible
they may be personally, will come from the same political party.
II.
Americans are accustomed to the possibility that the Loyal
Opposition of one period may serve as the leaders of the next. The
great precedent for this sort of transformation in the United States is
provided by the movement in 1801 from the Presidency of John Adams
to that of Thomas Jefferson-from a Federalist Party Administration to
a Republican Party Administration. This is often referred to as the first
significant instance in modern times of a peaceful transfer of power
from one political party to another, at least in a country as large as the
United States.
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That was in dramatic contrast to the bloody turmoil that the French
Revolution had created during the preceding decade. President
Jefferson, in his First Inaugural Address (of 1801), after taking note of
the vigorous election campaign to which the country had just been
subjected, asked for unity:
But every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We
have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are
all Republicans; we are all Federalists. If there be any among us who
would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let
them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error
of opinion may be tolerated, where reason is left free to combat it.
Earlier in this 1801 Address, the new President had urged his fellow
citizens to bear in mind this "sacred principle": "[Tihat, though the will
of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be
reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal
laws must protect and to violate which would be oppressive."
Sixty years later, the institution of a Loyal Opposition working within
a constitutional framework was severely tested in the United States
when the Southern States attempted to secede from the Union upon the
election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency. This began the Civil
War in 1861. Even so, some elements of the constitutional precedent
established in 1801 were already well entrenched. Thus, although the
country was still very much at war, President Lincoln stood for
reelection in 1864 and was prepared to turn over the presidency to his
opponents if defeated-to opponents who would probably have
abandoned his war policies.
President Lincoln, in his July 4, 1861 message to Congress, at a time
of growing rebellion in the South, called upon his people to
demonstrate to the world that those who can fairly carry an election,
can also suppress a rebellion-that ballots are the rightful, and
peaceful, successors of bullets; and that when ballots have fairly, and
constitutionally, decided, there can be no successful appeal back to
bullets; that there can be no successful appeal, except to ballots
themselves, at succeeding elections.
Earlier that year, in his own First Inaugural Address, President Lincoln
spelled out what he considered to be at the core of the secession to
which the Southern States had resorted in response to Lincoln's
election:
[T]he central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy. A majority,
held in restraint by constitutional checks, and limitations, and always
changing easily, with deliberate changes of popular opinions and
sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whatever
rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism.
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Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent
arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority
principle, anarchy, or despotism in some form, is all that is left.
The majority principle argued for here by President Lincoln means
that there is likely to be a minority that has a respected place in the
system, a minority that can endeavor to promote and build upon
"deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiment." Such a
minority, working within the constitutional system, is what is usually
known as the Loyal Opposition.
III.
The term "Loyal Opposition" goes back, for modem constitu-
tionalists, to British experience. The English government came to be
understood as made up of those Ministers who enjoy the confidence of
the Monarch, a confidence that Ministers now earn by the support they
secure in the House of Commons. Or, as Walter Bagehot, a
distinguished constitutional scholar, put it, "It has been said that
England invented the phrase, 'Her [or, His] Majesty's Opposition'; that
it was the first government which made a criticism of administration as
much a part of the polity as administration itself. This critical
opposition is the consequence of cabinet government."
Those members of the House of Commons who do not support the
government are, in the usual situation, the Loyal Opposition. Their
opposition is not to the Monarch, but rather to the Government (or its
policies), a government that they are prepared to replace at any time
with one of their own.
The rule of the English Parliament (the "mother of Parliaments") was
established in 1688, permanently eclipsing the power of the Monarch.
It took another century before the modem institution of the Loyal
Opposition was established. Winston Churchill described late
eighteenth-century developments in Britain:
It was an old tradition that politicians not in power need not bother to
attend Parliament, but should retire to their country estates and there
await the return to royal favour and a redistribution of the sweets of
office. Individualists of different schools, such as Shelbourne and
Henry Fox, consistently opposed [Edmund] Burke's efforts to
organise them into a party. "You think," Henry Fox had written to
[Lord] Rockingham, "you can but serve the country by continuing a
fruitless Opposition. I think it impossible to serve it at all except by
coming into office."
Burke's efforts included promotion of a consistent program to be
advocated in Opposition and realized in office.
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The preponderance of governmental powers in Great Britain is
exercised or regulated, directly or indirectly, by Parliament. It is,
therefore, clearer in that country than in the United States precisely
where the Loyal Opposition is, for the most part, located. It is found in
the House of Commons, reinforced heretofore by its milder counterpart
in the House of Lords. It is the House of Commons which, in principle,
authorizes and empowers the government of the day, with the Loyal
Opposition prepared to provide an alternative government whenever the
House of Commons is prepared to support it. (This change usually
comes about after a general election has changed party alignments in the
House of Commons.)
It has come to be understood, in Great Britain and elsewhere, that
things go better for all political parties when there is an opposition to
keep the government on its toes. A victorious Prime Minster could even
observe, after the opposing party seemed to fall apart in the 1900
election, that "the dual character of the English parties is for the
moment destroyed." He then expressed the hope "that our opponents
will get into fighting trim before long," because "it is bad for us, and it
is bad for the country, if they continue to occupy a position so little
conspicuous and effective as that which they occupy at the present
time." That a formidable adversary is necessary for the most effective
exercise of power is recognized in an institution as "authoritarian" as
the Roman Catholic Church (with its institutionalized debates during the
canonization process).
The institution of the Loyal Opposition usually depends upon a
system of elections and limited terms of office in the elected branches
of the government. Such a system offers recognized opportunities for
the challengers of those in power. It is not considered unpatriotic, or in
any way disrespectful, to attempt to replace those who happen to hold
office for the moment. Meaningful elections depend, at least in modem
circumstances, upon a wide-ranging freedom of speech, not only in the
legislative body itself, but also in the country at large. An elementary
requirement here is that the opponents to the government be considered
entitled to have access to adequate secretarial and other material
resources and to the major organs of communication.
This legitimation of opposition has as an important corollary a firm
limitation upon prosecutions for sedition and treason. Opponents of the
Government tend to be at risk unless there is a stringent limitation
placed upon the scope of such prosecutions. Edmund Burke, the
English statesman, warned in 1777 against "confounding the
unhappiness of civil dissension with the crime of treason." A decade
later, the rule was laid down in the American Constitution that "Treason
[Vol. 351014
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against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them,
or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." A few
years later, the First Amendment to the Constitution confirmed that
Congress could make no law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press."
IV.
The appropriate forms of, and limitations upon, opposition to rulers
have always been concerns of political men and women. At times, the
dangers facing the country incline citizens to forget their differences, at
least for the time being, as they prepare to deal with the enemy.
This may be seen, for example, in the way that the Republican Party
fell in line behind the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt once the
Second World War began. This is reflected in the front-page editorial,
the day after the attack in 1941 on Pearl Harbor, that was published by
the Chicago Tribune, a newspaper which had been up to that time a
bitter critic of the Democratic Administration in Washington:
[T]he thing that we all feared, that so many of us have worked with all
our hearts to avert, has happened. That is all that counts. It has
happened. America faces war thru no volition of any American.
Recriminations are useless and we doubt that they will be indulged
in. Certainly not by us. All that matters today is that we are in the
war and the nation must face that simple fact. All of us, from this day
forth, have only one task. That is to strike with all our might to
protect and preserve the American freedom that we all hold dear.
Similar sentiments could be heard after the 2001 assaults on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But even in such ominous
circumstances, the jailing of political opponents in the United States is
questionable. When it has happened, it has generally come to be
recognized as a mistake not only because of the hardships suffered by
the jailed critics but also because of the useful criticism that the country
was denied.
V.
It does take experience and discipline on the part of a people not to
regard conscientious criticism as really subversive. There are,
moreover, times and places when any opposition (not just armed
opposition) to the Government is regarded as disloyal, if not even as an
act of treason. But Harry Kalven, Jr., an American constitutional
scholar, has argued,
Seditious libel is ... the hallmark of closed societies throughout the
world. Under it criticism of government is viewed as defamation and
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punished as a crime. The treatment of such speech as criminal is
based on an accurate perception of the dangers in it; it is likely to
undermine confidence in government policies and in the official
incumbents. But political freedom ends when government can use its
powers and its courts to silence its critics. In my view, the presence or
absence in the law of the concept of seditious libel defines the society.
A society may or may not treat obscenity or contempt by publication
as legal offenses without altering its basic nature. If, however, it
makes seditious libel an offense, it is not a free society no matter what
its other characteristics.
Central to the way that the Loyal Opposition conducts itself is the
understanding that the country or regime is more worthy of allegiance
than any of its parties or personalities. Certain principles and ends are
presupposed, standards that are far more important than the ambitions or
interests of the contenders. Ambition is not ruled out, but it should be
an ambition both to excel within the regime and to be recognized as an
exemplary citizen. The Loyal Opposition wants to supply the
leadership for the country, a leadership that in turn will be opposed
according to the same rules.
The Government is thus put on notice that there are others equipped
and prepared to replace it. In those times and places where the
institution of Loyal Opposition is recognized, deliberation and choice
replace accident and force in the making and unmaking of constitutions
and governments.
If a government does not conduct itself pursuant to the constitutional
processes and expectations of the regime, it is vulnerable. In the
extreme case there can be recourse by the opposition to the sacred right
of revolution. The revolutionary citizen makes an appeal, in these
circumstances, to the principles of the regime. That is, he presents
himself as loyal to the regime in opposing, by force if necessary, the
usurper. A limited form of such opposition may be seen in the recourse
to civil disobedience. The institution of the Loyal Opposition, with its
dependence upon genuine elections and freedom of speech, tends to
make recourse to the right of revolution unnecessary.
VI.
In order to make this kind of system work routinely (not just in
response to invasion or other grave national crisis), it takes people of an
appropriate character and, related to that, people with salutary
experiences. The people's experiences include practice in dealing with
recognized adversaries in an organized manner.
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The most obvious experience of this character comes from everyday
involvement in associations where parliamentary rules, of one kind or
another, are relied upon. There are in the United States, for example,
innumerable organizations that operate according to parliamentary rules
that are in turn adapted from those used in Congress. Such rules are
designed to foster useful debate and to maintain good order, permitting
the majority to work its will in due course. They are related intimately
to the institution of freedom of speech.
The adversary system which dominates judicial proceedings in the
United States accustoms Americans to contend with each other in a
disciplined fashion. An effort is made by courts to get at the truth in the
matter at issue, with a view to doing justice. This is not unlike what
physical scientists do in attempting to discover the truth about their
subjects.
Perhaps the earliest training in disciplined competition occurs in
athletic contests. Both participants and partisan spectators get used to
both winning and losing; they may even learn that winning cannot be
everything, and that how one wins (as well as how one loses) can very
much matter.
A different, and perhaps the most extensive, form of instructive
competition in the United States may be seen in the activities of
multitudes in the economy of the country. Efforts to establish a market
economy in various parts of the world testify to the considerable
instruction and experience upon which such an economy relies.
All of these pursuits operate according to accepted rules. People
learn that success and satisfaction depend, more often than not, upon
sensible choices and hard work. They also learn that those who slack
off, lose confidence, or misjudge a situation are apt to be replaced by
some of their competitors.
Richard M. Nixon once observed, "There is one thing solid and
fundamental in politics: the law of change. What's up today is down
tomorrow." This is, in part, because the Loyal Opposition of the
moment may itself not be of one mind except with respect to opposing
the Government. After all, the Opposition is often a coalition of
divergent interests, which coalition in turn must deal, when in power,
not only with those it has replaced but also with the divisions within its
own ranks.
2004] 1017
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VII.
We return to the character of the people that it takes for a
constitutional system to work properly. The people make possible and
shape a regime, and are in turn shaped by that regime.
The British Colonies in North America, for example, were shaped
well before the Revolution of 1776 by considerable experience in self-
government. The regime established by the Constitution of 1787 has
helped the American people become practiced in the way that public
affairs should be conducted. This became so much, and so obviously
so, that Walter Bagehot could observe that "the men of Massachusetts"
could "work any constitution."
The Loyal Opposition in a democracy both reflects the opinion of the
people at large and is aware of what should be done if it should come to
power. Both the Government and its Loyal Opposition continually
appeal to the people. This, it has been suggested, means an important
role for the Press. The Press not only must inform the people but also
must help shape the people so that they can make proper use of what
they learn from the Press. Thus the Press, which can itself be spoken of
sometimes as a branch of the Loyal Opposition, must not be limited in
its nay-saying to what the Government of the day is saying and doing.
Since the people are, in these circumstances, the ultimate sovereign, a
responsible press must make efforts at times to oppose and reform
public opinion, something that can at times be difficult, if not even
dangerous, to do.
It has been assumed in this essay on the Loyal Opposition in a
democracy that the people, directly or indirectly, select the government.
But however it is selected, a sensible government takes advantage of
opportunities to determine what is going on-and, especially, what the
people are saying and what they will put up with.
It should not be forgotten, in any event, that sound arguments have
been made from antiquity to the effect that the best rulers do not truly
want to rule, that they assume the burdens of office more because of a
sense of duty than because of any desire to exercise power. This
approach does seem to be a lot to hope for-but such a teaching does
put an electorate on notice about the risks of excessive ambition.
A Loyal Opposition should be welcomed by those who do happen to
be in power for the time being, especially if they are reminded that it is
far more important that there be good rule than that there be particular
rulers. Useful restraints upon mere ambition can also be supplied by
well-established religious faiths in a community, however troublesome
politically such faiths can be when their adherents are permitted to
Loyal Opposition in a Modern Democracy
become as fanatical in their deeds as they may happen to be in their
language and opinions.
VIII.
The political life of a community cannot be all-consuming if there is
to be an orderly movement in and out of office. Cutthroat politics are
more apt to be avoided if it is not a life-and-death matter whether one is
in office or has access to patronage.
Those who are out of office should be assured that they can still use
their talents and energies to live decently and securely. Otherwise, the
prospect of losing can be shattering-and desperate measures are apt to
be resorted to in order to avoid that fate. There must be, that is,
competing centers of power, prestige, and wealth somewhat
independent of government control.
It remains to be seen whether a stable democracy, on a large scale, is
possible in modern times without a market economy. This bears upon
whether an opposition press can be reliably financed, whether there are
refuges for the losers and disfavored outside of government, and
whether power can be distributed efficiently throughout the community.
This is not to deny that a market economy can itself be ruthless in its
operations. But if adequate "safety nets" are provided for the
unfortunate, there can be more of a sense of self-determination and
opportunities being available and less of a sense of oppression and
exploitation being suffered than there are apt to be in those systems
where allocation of resources and privileges is made by the authorities.
In a free political order and a market economy, ambition is apt to
promote energy and application, moving the talented far more and far
longer than any bureaucracy is either inclined or equipped to do. In
looking out for oneself in accordance with the generally accepted rules
of the game, one is expected to make the contribution one is equipped
and permitted to make in the community.
Ix.
Ambition is needed if there is to be a healthy political life. That is,
people are needed who want to distinguish themselves in serving the
community. Yet ambition can also be corrosive, especially when there
are old grievances to be avenged or exploited. We have seen in the
Balkans in recent years, and are seeing in the Middle East today, what
can happen when no ethnic group in a multi-ethnic political association
can contemplate with equanimity the prospect of being part of the Loyal
Opposition.
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The ancient Athenians had, instead of the humane tradition of Loyal
Opposition, the arbitrary institution of ostracism to fall back upon when
it was feared that anyone was becoming too big for the regime to be
able to handle with safety. Thus, a prominent man could simply be
banished for a term of years by the vote of his fellow citizens, even
though there had been neither an indictment nor a trial. In the Western
World, the classic case to be avoided of ambition running wild has been
the emergence of Caesarism in Republican Rome. (This was
anticipated by Thucydides' Alcibiades.)
Rome's remarkable successes abroad contributed to the subversion of
the Republic at home, especially as its leading men so distinguished
themselves in their military commands as to secure the allegiance of
armies. This was a far cry from the precedent of a Cincinnatus who
could answer his country's call in a great emergency and then return to
his modest farm once he had done what had been expected of him.
Cincinnatus provided a model for men such as George Washington in
the United States.
At the heart, then, of a vital spirit of Loyal Opposition is the settled
opinion in the community that there are things more important than
one's own interests, or even the interests of one's party. It is a
dedication to established common objectives that reminds political
opponents that what unites them should be considered far more
significant, and more enduring, than what happens to divide them for
the moment.
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